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Abstract: It is very long known attackers may use forged source IP address to obscure their real locations. 
To capture the spoofers, a number of IP traceback mechanisms have been proposed. However, due to the 
challenges of deployment, there has been not a widely adopted IP traceback solution, at least at the 
Internet level. As a result, the mist on the locations of spoofers has never been dissipated till now. This 
paper proposes passive IP traceback (PIT) that bypasses the deployment difficulties of IP traceback 
techniques. PIT investigates Internet Control Message Protocol error messages (named path backscatter) 
triggered by spoofing traffic, and tracks the spoofers based on public available information (e.g., 
topology). In this way, PIT can find the spoofers without any deployment requirement. This paper 
illustrates the causes, collection, and the statistical results on path backscatter, demonstrates the 
processes and effectiveness of PIT, and shows the captured locations of spoofers through applying PIT on 
the path backscatter data set. These results can help further reveal IP spoofing, which has been studied 
for long but never well understood. Though PIT cannot work in all the spoofing attacks, it may be the 
most useful mechanism to trace spoofers before an Internet-level traceback system has been deployed in 
real.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
IP SPOOFING, which means attackers launching 
attacks with forged source IP addresses, has been 
recognized as a serious security problem on the 
Internet for long. By using addresses that are 
assigned to others or not assigned at all, attackers 
can avoid exposing their real locations, or enhance 
the effect of attacking, or launch reflection based 
attacks. A number of notorious attacks rely on IP 
spoofing, including SYN flooding, SMURF, DNS 
amplification etc. 
A DNS amplification attack which severely 
degraded the service of a Top Level Domain (TLD) 
name server is reported in this system. Though 
there has been a popular conventional wisdom that 
DoS attacks are launched from botnets and 
spoofing is no longer critical, the report of ARBOR 
on NANOG 50th meeting shows spoofing is still 
significant in observed DoS attacks. Indeed, based 
on the captured backscatter messages from UCSD 
Network Telescopes, spoofing activities are still 
frequently observed. 
To capture the origins of IP spoofing traffic is of 
great importance. As long as the real locations of 
spoofers are not disclosed, they cannot be deterred 
from launching further attacks. Even just 
approaching the spoofers, for example, determining 
the ASes or networks they reside in, attackers can 
be located in a smaller area, and filters can be 
placed closer to the attacker before attacking traffic 
get aggregated. The last but not the least, 
identifying the origins of spoofing traffic can help 
build a reputation system for ASes, which would be 
helpful to push the corresponding ISPs to verify IP 
source address. 
However, to capture the origins of IP spoofing 
traffic on the Internet is thorny. The research of 
identifying the origin of spoofing traffic is 
categorized in IP traceback. To build an IP 
traceback system on the Internet faces at least two 
critical challenges. The first one is the cost to adopt 
a traceback mechanism in the routing system. 
Existing traceback mechanisms are either not 
widely supported by current commodity routers 
(packet marking), or will introduce considerable 
overhead to the routers (Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMP) generation, packet logging), 
especially in high-performance networks. The 
second one is the difficulty to make Internet service 
providers (ISPs) collaborate. Since the spoofers 
could spread over every corner of the world, a 
single ISP to deploy its own traceback system is 
almost meaningless. However, ISPs, which are 
commercial entities with competitive relationships, 
are generally lack of explicit economic incentive to 
help clients of the others to trace attacker in their 
managed ASes.  
Since the deployment of traceback mechanisms is 
not of clear gains but apparently high overhead, to 
the best knowledge of authors, there has been no 
deployed Internet-scale IP traceback system till 
now. As a result, despite that there are a lot of  IP 
traceback mechanisms proposed and a large 
number of spoofing activities observed, the real 
locations of spoofers still remain a mystery.  
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II. LITREACHER SURVEY 
1) Efficient Packet Marking for Large-Scale IP   
Traceback 
It present a new approach to IP traceback based on 
the probabilistic packet marking paradigm. Our 
approach, which we call randomize-and-link, uses 
large checksum cords to “link” message fragments 
in a way that is highly scalable, for the checksums 
serve both as associative addresses and data 
integrity verifiers. The main advantage of these 
checksum cords is that they spread the addresses of 
possible router messages across a spectrum that is 
too large for the attacker to easily create messages 
that collide with legitimate messages. Our methods 
therefore scale to attack trees containing hundreds 
of routers and do not require that a victim know the 
topology of the attack tree a priori. 
2) Practical Network Support for IP Traceback  
It describes a technique for tracing anonymous 
packet flooding attacks in the Internet back towards 
their source. This work is motivated by the 
increased frequency and sophistication of denial-
of-service attacks and by the difficulty in tracing 
packets with incorrect, or “spoofed”, source 
addresses. In this paper we describe a general 
purpose traceback mechanism based on 
probabilistic packet marking in the network. Our 
approach allows a victim to identify the network 
path(s) traversed by attack traffic without requiring 
interactive operational support from Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs).  
3) FIT: Fast Internet Traceback  
The costs of the damages are often on the order of 
several billion of dollars. Traceback mechanisms 
are a critical part of the defense against IP spoofing 
and DoS attacks. Current traceback mechanisms 
are inadequate to address the traceback problem 
Problems with the current traceback mechanisms 
III. RELATED PROBLEM 
Though PIT is used to perform ip TRACEBACK, it 
is very different from existing ip TRACEBACK 
mechanisms. PIT is inspired by a number of ip 
spoofing observation activities. Thus, the related 
work is composed by two parts. The first briefly 
introduces existing ip TRACEBACK mechanisms, 
and the second introduces the ip spoofing 
observation activites. 
3.1. IP Traceback 
Information processing TRACEBACK IP 
TRACEBACK techniques square measure 
designed to disclose the important origin of 
information processing traffic or track the trail. 
Existing information processing TRACEBACK 
approaches are usually classified into 5 main 
categories: packet marking, ICMP TRACEBACK, 
logging on the router, link testing, overlay, and 
hybrid tracing. Packet marking strategies need 
routers modify the Header of the packet to contain 
the info of the router and forwarding call. So the 
receiver of the packet can then reconstruct the trail 
of a packet from the received packets. There are 
two Classes of packet marking schemes: 
probabilistic packet marking and settled packet 
marking. Packet marking methods are generally 
considered to be lightweight because they do not 
price storage resource on routers and the link 
bandwidth resource. However, packet marking is 
not a wide supported operate on routers; so, it's 
tough to switch packet marking TRACEBACK at 
intervals the network.  
 
3.2. IP Spoofing Observation 
Network telescope may be a basic technique for 
Passive observation of spoofing activities on the 
internet. Network telescope captures non-solicited 
messages, which area unit in the main generated by 
victim attacked by traffic with source prefix set in 
the scope closely-held by the telescope. Then, it 
can be Determined a part of nodes which area unit 
attacked by spoofing traffic. Currently, the largest 
scale telescope is the CAIDA UCSD telescope, 
which owns 1/256 of all the ip addresses and is in 
the main used to observe DDoS activities and 
worms. More el at. Conferred a method namely 
“back-scatter analysis” that uses the feature of DoS 
attacks based mostly on traces collected by the 
network telescope. Though ICMP error message 
provides publicly accessible information. A recent 
report from Arbor network based mostly on 
additional than 5000 attacks shows an intriguing 
result  unreasonable per IP traffic of 4Gbps is 
determined in 100% attacks, and significant rate of 
TCP connections area unit launched from just a 
few validated hosts. Though this is not direct 
evidence of spoofing, it suggests spoofing could be 
used in such attacks 
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IV. PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
a novel solution, named Passive IP Traceback 
(PIT), to bypass the challenges in deployment. 
Routers may fail to forward an IP spoofing packet 
due to various reasons, e.g., TTL exceeding. In 
such cases, the routers may generate an ICMP error 
message (named path backscatter) and send the 
message to the spoofed source address. Because the 
routers can be close to the spoofers, the path 
backscatter messages may potentially disclose the 
locations of the spoofers.  
PIT exploits these path backscatter messages to 
find the location of the spoofers. With the locations 
of the spoofers known, the victim can seek help 
from the corresponding ISP to filter out the 
attacking packets, or take other counterattacks.  
PIT is especially useful for the victims in reflection 
based spoofing attacks, e.g., DNS amplification 
attacks. The victims can find the locations of the 
spoofers directly from the attacking traffic. 
This is the first article known which deeply 
investigates path backscatter messages. These 
messages are valuable to help understand spoofing 
activities. Though Moore has exploited backscatter 
messages, which are generated by the targets of 
spoofing messages, to study Denial of Services 
(DoS), path backscatter messages, which are sent 
by intermediate devices rather than the targets, 
have not been used in traceback.  
 Practical and effective IP traceback solution based 
on path backscatter messages, i.e., PIT, is 
proposed. PIT bypasses the deployment difficulties 
of existing IP traceback mechanisms and actually is 
already in force. Though given the limitation that 
path backscatter messages are not generated with 
stable possibility, PIT cannot work in all the 
attacks, but it does work in a number of spoofing 
activities. At least it may be the most useful 
traceback mechanism before an AS-level traceback 
system has been deployed in real.  
Through applying PIT on the path backscatter 
dataset, a number of locations of spoofers are 
captured and presented. Though this is not a 
complete list, it is the first known list disclosing the 
locations of spoofers. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
Service provider: 
The service provider will browse the data file, 
initialize the router nodes, for security purpose 
service provider encrypts the data file and then 
sends to the particular receivers (A, B, C, D…). 
Service provider will send their data file to router 
and router will select smallest distance path and 
send to particular receiver. 
Router 
The Router manages a multiple nodes to provide 
data storage service. In router n-number of nodes 
are present (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5…). In a router 
service provider can view node details and routing 
path details. Service provider will send their data 
file to router and router will select smallest distance 
path and send to particular receiver. If any attacker 
is found in a node then flow will be send to IDS 
manager and router will connect to another node 
and send to particular receiver. 
IDS Manager 
The IDS Manager detects introducer and stores the 
introducer details. In a router any type of attacker 
(All Spoofers like source, destination, DOS 
Attacker) is found then details will send to IDS 
manager. And IDS Manager will detect the attacker 
type (Active attacker or passive attacker), and 
response will send to the router. And also inside the 
IDS Manager we can view the attacker details with 
their tags such as attacker type, attacked node 
name, time and date. 
Receiver (End User) 
The receiver can receive the data file from the 
router. Service provider will send data file to router 
and router will accept the data and send to 
particular receiver (A, B, C, D, E and F). The 
receivers receive the file in decrypted format by 
without changing the File Contents. Users may 
receive particular data files within the network 
only.  
Attacker 
there are a two types of attacker is present one is 
who is spoofing the Ip address. Active attacker is 
one who is injecting malicious data to the 
corresponding node and also passive attacker will 
change the destination IP of the particular node. 
After attacking a node we can view attacked nodes 
inside router. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It try to dissipate the mist on the locations of 
spoofers based on investigating the path 
backscatter messages. In this article, we proposed 
Passive IP Traceback (PIT) which tracks spoofers 
based on path backscatter messages and public 
available information. We illustrate causes, 
collection, and statistical results on path 
backscatter. We specified how to apply PIT when 
the topology and routing are both known, or the 
routing is unknown, or neither of them are known. 
We presented two effective algorithms to apply PIT 
in large scale networks and proofed their 
correctness. We demonstrated the effectiveness of 
PIT based on deduction and simulation. We 
showed the captured locations of spoofers through 
applying PIT on the path backscatter dataset. These 
results can help further reveal IP spoofing, which 
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has been studied for long but never well 
understood. 
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